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Abstract—Cognitive radio networks (CRN) sense spectrum
occupancy and manage themselves to operate in unused bands
without disturbing licensed users. The detection capability of a
radio system can be enhanced if the sensing process is performed
jointly by a group of nodes so that the effects of wireless fading
and shadowing can be minimized. However, taking a collaborative
approach poses new security threats to the system as nodes can
report false sensing data to force a wrong decision. Providing
security to the sensing process is also complex, as it usually
involves introducing limitations to the CRN applications. The
most common limitation is the need for a static trusted node that
is able to authenticate and merge the reports of all CRN nodes.
This paper overcomes this limitation by presenting a protocol
that is suitable for fully distributed scenarios, where there is no
static trusted node.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum is an essential resource for the provision of mobile
services. In order to control and delimit its use, governmen-
tal agencies set up regulatory policies. Unfortunately, such
policies have led to a deficiency of spectrum as only few
frequency bands are left unlicensed, and these are used for
the majority of new emerging wireless applications. Besides,
studies conducted by the Spectrum Policy Task Force show
that most of the licensed spectrum is largely under-utilized
[1]. Thus, a large portion of the assigned spectrum is only
used sporadically, and this has led to an unnecessary shortage
of spectrum.
A promising way to alleviate the spectrum shortage problem
is adopting a spectrum sharing paradigm in which frequency
bands are used opportunistically. In a spectrum sharing sce-
nario, those who own the license to use the spectrum are re-
ferred to as primary users, and those who access the spectrum
opportunistically are referred to as secondary users. Secondary
users must not interfere with primary ones, who always have
usage priority.
The enabling technology for opportunistic sharing is Cogni-
tive Radio (CR) [2]. A CR is a system that senses its electro-
magnetic environment and can dynamically and autonomously
adjust its operating parameters to access the spectrum.
CR terminals form self-organizing networks capable to
detect vacant spectrum bands that can be used without harmful
interference with primary nodes. Once a vacant band is found,
secondary nodes coordinate themselves in order to share the
available spectrum.
Performing reliable spectrum sensing is a difficult task. This
is mainly due to the fact that wireless channels can suffer
fading, and this can result in nodes failing to detect a primary
transmitter. This is known as the hidden node problem. As the
most important challenge for a CR is to identify the presence
of primary nodes, secondary nodes must be significantly
more sensitive in detecting primary transmissions than primary
receivers.
In order to reduce the sensitivity requirements of individual
CRs, recent studies propose performing distributed spectrum
sensing (DSS)[3]. In DSS, multiple secondary nodes cooperate
and share their local sensing results, which are then merged
together to reach a final decision. These protocols assume that
reports from secondary nodes can be effectively authenticated.
As a result, malicious nodes can be detected -their reports
repeatedly differ from the final decision- and their contribu-
tions discarded. However, the mechanisms proposed to date
to authenticate the observations sent by secondary nodes are
based on the introduction of requirements that usually make
the security solution hardly applicable to real scenarios.
The most common restriction imposed by authentication
protocols is the need for a static trusted node. This trusted
node is mainly used to:
 access a Public Key Infrastructure that allows verifying
the validity of public key certificates,
 merge the sensing results shared by the secondary nodes
and make a joint decision, which is trusted by all the
nodes
Obviously, the trusted node simplifies the protection of the
spectrum sensing protocol. However, unfortunately, this kind
of entity is not present in all CRN scenarios. On the contrary,
CR networks are characterised by:
 being created in an ad-hoc fashion by nodes that have no
a priori knowledge of each other,
 being very dynamic, in the sense that there is no node
that is always present,
 having limited access to Internet and, thus, to a Public
Key Infrastructure.
Therefore, in this paper we present a protocol that allows
conducting the cooperative spectrum sensing in a fully dis-
tributed way. This means that our protocol allows authenticat-
ing the sensing results and making a joint decision without
the requirement of a static trusted node. The protocol has
been designed, additionally, to minimise the used bandwidth,
since the opportunistic access to the spectrum requires a very
efficient use of the network.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the related work on cooperative spectrum sensing.
Section III presents the main characteristics of the security
framework proposed. Sections IV, V and VI describe the three
main parts of the cooperative sensing protocol. Section VII
provides a discussion on the main aspects of the protocol.
Section VIII concludes the paper and points out future direc-
tions.
II. BACKGROUND
Cooperative sensing is based on merging the local obser-
vations of multiple secondary nodes. Since local spectrum
sensing results are subject to multipath and/or shadowing
fading, the cooperation among CRs is fundamental to achieve
a reliable decision.
Several data fusion schemes have been proposed to merge
the sensing data observed by every secondary node. Among
the proposed methods, the most typical one is based on
applying the “k out of N” rule. This rule determines that the
channel is occupied if at least k of the N secondary nodes
have detected the primary signal. As avoiding interference with
primary nodes is a top priority, the most common value of k
is 1.
Many other methods have been proposed for merging the
sensing data. In [4], authors review the main cooperative
sensing protocols that assume the existence of malicious nodes
in the network and try to nullify their effects. As it can be
seen, several proposals are intended to increase the security of
the cooperative sensing process by authenticating the sensing
results contributed by each node [5], [6], [7]. Indeed, including
authenticating mechanisms in the cooperative sensing proto-
cols is fundamental, as it allows building reputation systems in
which the identity claimed by each node can be verified, and
so the reliability of each contribution can be weighed correctly
according to the reputation of the node.
The problem, as is usually the case, is that the inclusion of
security mechanisms in the protocols leads to the introduction
of restrictions in the design of the network and its applications.
Thus, secure cooperative sensing protocols proposed so far are
based on the assumption that the CRN contains a node that can
play the role of a fusion centre. The fusion centre is conceived
as a well-known and static entity in the network that manages
the spectrum of a certain area and connects to the Internet and
to any Certification Authority (CA), if required. The role of
the fusion centre is assumed by a secondary base-station or a
spectrum broker.
The problem is that this trusted central node is not nec-
essarily found in many CRN scenarios, because the network
is completely dynamic and is created in an ad-hoc manner.
Additionally, from the security point of view, this central node
becomes a single point of failure, which can easily compro-
mise the security of the whole network if it is successfully
attacked.
In this paper, thus, we face the challenge of designing
a cooperative sensing protocol that allows CRN nodes to
sense the spectrum and decide whether the channel is free
or occupied in a fully distributed way, without depending on
a secure and trusted fusion centre.
Before describing our protocol in detail in sections IV, V
and VI, the following section presents the security framework
that we have assumed in order to define our protocol.
III. SECURITY FRAMEWORK
One of the key goals of the protocol design is to develop an
efficient solution suitable for constrained devices. Therefore,
the cryptography involved in our proposal is based on simple
hash functions and symmetric keys.
The use of symmetric keys is essential to implement the
authentication of the sensing data provided by the secondary
nodes. However, the main challenge of symmetric key systems
is how to distribute and manage the keys among the authorized
nodes. Different lightweight processing solutions have been
proposed in the scope of sensor networks, which pre-distribute
or dynamically generate the secret keys using probabilistic
approaches (see a review in [8]). However, such schemes
are impractical for CRNs due to the particular features that
differentiate a CRN from a traditional sensor network, namely:
1) The topology of CRNs is continuously changing. Some
sensor networks are dynamic in the sense that they allow
addition and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment
to extend the network or replace failing and unreliable
nodes without physical contact; however, the dynamism
of CRN goes further: nodes are mobile and join and
leave a particular community in short periods of time.
2) The number of network members is several orders of
magnitude larger than that of sensor networks. The
number of connected members in a particular moment
is similar to a sensor network, but in an open CRN
network, the number of potential nodes is unlimited and
so, key management must be highly scalable. Moreover,
it must allow the addition of new nodes in the system
in the course of time as opposed to admitting them all
at once at system start-up.
3) In a CRN, the channels can only be used for limited
periods of time (while primary nodes are not active).
Thus, the time available for data transmission must be
maximized and the security protocols must be designed
in such a way that they introduce the minimum possible
overhead.
With these challenging operational requirements, the use of
sensor network designed schemes for key distribution becomes
too complex in CRNs.
As we already mentioned, the main goal of our proposal is
to enable the secure authentication of nodes’ sensing reports,
and to allow nodes to take a joint decision on whether the
channel is free or occupied.
In order to achieve these goals, we have defined a protocol
that allows both hard-decision and soft-decision techniques.
Thus, nodes can exchange all the information of their local
observations, or they can share only their individual 1-bit
decisions (free or occupied).
In order to identify network nodes, we take advantage of the
fact that CRNs are suitable for more powerful devices than
sensor networks are, so we take a public key infrastructure
(PKI) approach to initialize the network. However, as this
process is costly, it is executed only once, when a new
node joins the cognitive radio network. From that moment
on, the messages are signed using efficient Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) functions.
HMAC functions provide message authenticity and integrity
by calculating a hash of two inputs: the target message and a
secret key. In our protocol, we use hash chains to produce
the one-time secret keys. Hash Chains, first proposed by
Lamport [9], are versatile low-cost constructions that are used
extensively in various cryptographic systems.
We also take advantage of the fact that messages exchanged
between nodes are sent through a wireless environment, which
means that all nodes can receive the messages as if they were
sent to a broadcast address.
The design of our proposed protocol also requires the
acceptance of some assumptions, which we describe below:
 The exchange of messages between the secondary nodes
is carried out through a common control channel. The
mechanism used to implement this control channel is out
of the scope of this paper.
 Every network node has a public key certificate, which
the node has obtained before entering the cognitive radio
network. Nodes also have the public key of the Certifica-
tion Authority that generates the public key certificates.
 The cognitive radio network is not permanently discon-
nected from the Internet. This means that the network
usually has one or more nodes with Internet connection,
and thus they have access to a Public Key Infrastructure.
The nodes that have Internet connection do not necessar-
ily have to be the same ones all the time.
 Every node uses the same protocol to merge the sensing
results of other nodes and update the corresponding
reputations.
With these assumptions, we have defined a protocol that
is based on three main procedures: election of a coordinator
node, node registry, and cooperative spectrum sensing. In the
following sections, we describe each one of these procedures
in detail.
IV. ELECTING A COORDINATOR NODE
As we have already mentioned, our protocol is intended to
allow nodes of a CRN to decide if a channel is free or occupied
in a secure and fully distributed way, without depending on any
static trusted node. In order to make this possible, however,
our protocol is based on the use of nodes that centralise and
coordinate the authentication of nodes and the joint decision-
making. Nonetheless, nodes taking this role do not necessarily
have to be trusted by the other nodes, they do not need to be
known in advance, and they can vary over time.
In our proposal, unlike centralised protocols, all network
nodes can verify the authenticity of the other nodes’ messages,
merge the different results, calculate the final sensing decision,
and update the reputation assigned to the other nodes.
The fact that all nodes can merge the sensing results and
calculate the reputation of the other nodes allows verifying the
reliability of the coordinator node. Thus, a coordinator whose
decisions are repeatedly different from those of the majority
will be rapidly considered badly, and this will result in the
replacement of this coordinator.
As we can see, additionally, the fact that all nodes have
all the information needed to authenticate and calculate the
reputations of the other nodes allows coordinator replacements
to be quick, and therefore feasible. Otherwise, the information
regarding identities, reputations, signing keys, etc. would have
to be transmitted from one coordinator to the next every time
the coordinator was changed. Besides, as all nodes share this
information, the coordinator role can be easily assumed by
any node.
In order to elect the coordinator node, as we have previously
mentioned, we assume that the CRN is usually connected to
the Internet. This means that there is usually some node that
has Internet connection and, thus, can connect to a Validation
Authority (VA). Only nodes with Internet connection can
assume the coordinator role. The election process, which
is based on the clusterhead election algorithm for ad-hoc
networks presented in [10], is as follows:
1) nodes with Internet connection announce their avail-
ablity to play the coordinator role.
2) from these candidates, nodes select the one with the
highest reputation value from their reputation table.
3) nodes send their vote in a signed message.
4) the winner is decided based on simple majority. The
previous coordinator sends a broadcast message to an-
nounce the winner.
5) If nodes disagree with the previous coordinator’s mes-
sage, they send a reply with its choice of candidate. If
at least 50% of the nodes support this last candidature,
the elected coordinator is the last one.
Once the new coordinator is elected, it obtains a signed
confirmation of the validity of its public key certificate from
a Validation Authority (VA). This confirmation is broadcasted
so that the other nodes can verify the messages signed by this
new coordinator securely from this moment on.
Additionally, in order for the newly elected nodes to be
trusted throughout the different sensing sessions, this election
process is repeated periodically. The exact periodicity to use
will not be the same for all possible CRN scenarios. It can
depend on the specific parameters or characteristics of the
network, such as the average node trustworthiness, or the
network’s degree of dynamism, etc. Moreover, this periodicity
can be extended over time if the coordinator node repeatedly
proves that it can be trusted.
To avoid unnecessary processes of coordinator replacement,
before starting a new election process, nodes vote if the current
coordinator is not trustworthy any more and it is necessary
to replace it. In order to decide their vote, nodes use the
reputation that the coordinator has built over the different
sensing sessions, as we will see in section VI.
It is also worth noting that, if the coordinator loses its
Internet connection, it must request a coordinator replacement,
as it can no longer verify the identity of new network nodes
by connecting to a Certification Authority.
V. NODE REGISTRY
In order to register to the CRN, a new node has to perform
the following steps:
1) The new node Q selects a random number RQ and
prepares a hash chain of length N , where N is selected
according to the memory availability of Q. The values
of this hash chain will be used as the signing keys of
the HMAC functions:
VQ[N   1] = RQ
VQ[N   2] = hash(RQ)
VQ[N   3] = hash(hash(RQ)) = hash(VQ[N   2])
  
VQ[0] = hash(VQ[1])
Thus, VQ[0] is the first signing key used by Q, VQ[1]
is the second, and so on. Obviously, as VQ[i   1] =
hash(VQ[i]), by knowing VQ[i] we can calculate VQ[i 
1] easily. However, by knowing VQ[i  1], it is theoret-
ically impossible to compute VQ[i].
2) Q sends a broadcast message requesting to register to
the CRN
3) The coordinator node replies requesting the authentica-
tion of Q. This reply is signed with the coordinator’s
private key.
4) Q sends the following authentication information:
 Q’s public key certificate
 The top value of Q’s hash chain (VQ[0]) signed with
Q’s private key.
5) The coordinator connects to a VA to obtain and broad-
cast the signed confirmation of the validity of Q’s public
key certificate. This allows the other nodes to verify the
messages signed by Q from this moment on.
6) The other nodes of the CRN store VQ[0] as the first
signing key to be used by Q. Thus, all those nodes that
have been able to listen to the previous steps 1 to 5
will be able to verify the authenticity of the messages
signed by Q, using an HMAC function and the hash
chain values VQ[0] to VQ[N   1].
VI. COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING
This section presents the procedure followed by cognitive
radio nodes to authenticate the sensing reports of every node
and calculate a common sensing decision. The protocol pre-
vents nodes from illegitimately claiming false identities and
from injecting fake sensing data. Thus, this protocol aims at
withstanding the following attacks:
 Altering the final sensing decision. A node could incre-
ment her weight in the data fusion process by forging
several identities and making a contribution for each of
them. With enough forged identities, a node might be able
to completely alter the aggregate reading.
 Deceiving the reputation system. By using a different
identity each time, a node might report false sensing data
repeatedly and avoid earning a bad reputation.
 Obtaining resources unfairly. A node could use many
identities to obtain more than her fair share of resources
(e.g. bandwidth).
This part of our proposed protocol is the most important
one, as it allows:
 sharing the signing keys, reputations and other node
information securely, rapidly and efficiently.
 calculating the reputation of the coordinator node, so that
the CRN nodes can decide jointly if this node cannot be
trusted any more and has to be replaced by another one.
Thus, as we will see, this part of the protocol allows new
nodes to obtain the reputations and signing keys of all the
other nodes. This information, as we have seen in the previous
section, has not been transmitted to the new nodes during the
registration process, thus saving a lot of network bandwidth.
The protocol is based on the fact that each node s uses a
reputation table built as follows:
ReputationTables = [ [Id1; Reputations[1]; V1[i]];    ;
[IdS ; Reputations[S]; VS [j]] ]
where S is the total number of nodes in the network at a given
moment, Idi is the identifier of node i, and fi    jg is the set
of indexes to the hash chain values of each node. Thus, as we
can see, this table contains the list of reputations and signing
keys of all CRN nodes.
The steps required to perform the cooperative spectrum
sensing are as follows:
1) The coordinator node announces which channels have
to be sensed for the current sensing session.
2) Each node s senses the spectrum and reports the follow-
ing information:
Results = HMACVs[i] (Ids; SensingResults;
Reputations[s])
where
 HMACVs[i] is the result of applying an HMAC
function using the hash chain value Vs[i] as the sign-
ing key. The information is also sent in cleartext, so
as to allow nodes to obtain the data and verify the
HMAC signature.
 SensingResults is the sensing result of node s
 Reputations[s] is the reputation that node s has
calculated for itself throughout the different sensing
sessions.
3) The coordinator node, once the time needed by all nodes
to share their sensing results has elapsed, requests all
nodes to send the signing key (Vs[i]) used to build their
sensing result in the previous step.
At this point, we assume that the exchange of messages
is synchronised in such a way that it is possible to detect
that a message is invalid if it has not been sent at the
correct time.
4) Each node s sends the signing key used in step 2: Vs[i]
5) With the information provided by the sensing re-
sults sent in step 2, each new node Q creates its
ReputationTableQ. As we have seen in the registration
process, no information about the reputation or the
signing keys of other nodes is provided to Q when it
joins the network.
6) Each node s builds a list of results to ignore:
IgnoreLists = [ [Idw1 ; Reputations[w1]];    ;
[ [Idwi ; Reputations[wi]];    ;
[ [IdwZ ; Reputations[wZ ]] ]
where Z is the number of results to ignore, and nodes
fIdw1 ;    ; IdwZg are those that:
 the HMAC signature verification has failed, or
 the reputation reported by the node is different from
that stored by node s, or
 there is no evidence of the node having registered
to the network, or
 no sensing result has been received,
and Reputations[wi] is the reputation stored by s for
node wi, or null if wi is not in the reputation table.
7) Each node s calculates the final sensing decision from
the sensing results received. In order to weigh up each
node’s contribution according to its reputation, s uses
the weighted fusion approach presented by Chen et al.
in [11].
8) From the final sensing decision made in the previous
step, each node s updates the reputations of the other
nodes and stores them in ReputationTables. The algo-
rithm used to update these reputations is again the one
presented by Chen et al. in [11].
9) The coordinator broadcasts the list of results to ignore
(IgnoreListc) and its final sensing decision.
10) Each new node Q corrects its ReputationTableQ with
the information provided by IgnoreListc.
11) Each node s compares its final sensing decision and
its list of nodes to ignore (IgnoreLists) with the
corresponding information from the coordinator node.
From this comparison:
a) s updates the coordinator’s reputation. Again, the
algorithm used to update the coordinator’s reputa-
tion is the one presented by Chen et al. in [11]. In
this case, however, this algorithm is applied taking
into account that having a different final sensing
decision decreases the reputation a lot more than
having individual differences in the list of results
to ignore.
b) s completes its reputation table, including the
information of those nodes that were not present
in ReputationTables and were not included in
IgnoreListc.
After performing the steps above, the final decision an-
nounced by the coordinator in step 9 is the one followed by
all the secondary nodes to decide whether the channel is free
or occupied. However, as we have seen in steps 7 and 8, every
node computes its own final decision and updates its own
reputation table. Thus, nodes can compare their decision and
their reputation table with the coordinator’s. This comparison
performed in step 11 allows nodes to decide whether the
coordinator has to be replaced, which is decided by vote as
we have seen in section IV.
VII. DISCUSSION
A remarkable aspect of the proposed protocol is that it
allows introducing new nodes in the CRN without the trans-
mission of all node reputations and signing keys. Thus, we are
avoiding the sending of an excessive amount of information
over the network, mainly when the number of nodes is high.
The protocol also allows a node to authenticate the sensing
results of the other nodes, even when it has no access to
a Public Key Infrastructure. This is due to the confirmation
of the validity of new nodes’ public key certificates, which
the coordinator obtains from the Validation Authority and
broadcasts to the other nodes.
The information shared by nodes is validated by the co-
ordinator indirectly. This means that new nodes can verify
that the reputations and the signing keys reported by the other
nodes are valid if the coordinator does not include them in its
IgnoreListc. Additionally, nodes can update their reputation
tables with the information of the other nodes when they detect
that the reputation given by the majority to the coordinator is
significantly different from their own.
The protocol uses a small amount of bandwidth due to
the use of HMAC functions for message authentication. Once
the node has announced its public key and first signing key,
all subsequent messages are signed using lightweight HMAC
functions. This reduces the amount of transmitted information
significantly. The HMAC keys can be generated and checked
with efficient mechanisms for fast chain traversal [12] and for
economic setup and verification [13]: a one-way chain with N
elements only requires log(N) storage and log(N) computation
to access an element.
From the security point of view, the proposed system is
robust against Sybil attacks, in which a user illegitimately
claims multiple identities, and the injection of false sensing
reports. Sybil attacks are prevented using certificates generated
by a Certification Authority. If a node does not own a valid
certificate, it is not authorized in the CR network and cannot
send sensing reports to the other nodes. On the other hand, the
injection of false sensing reports is avoided using verifiable
HMAC signed reports.
The protocol does not use any static fusion centre or trusted
node, thus avoiding the problem of having a single point of
failure, which might compromise the security of the whole
network if it was successfully attacked. Besides, this makes
the protocol suitable for a wider range of CRN applications
in which this kind of entity does not exist.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative sensing protocols are vulnerable to malicious
attacks that can result in erroneous decisions: the failure to
recognize primary node signals and thus provoke inconvenient
interferences; the mistake to consider a channel is occupied
and cannot be used for CR users; or simply making an unfair
distribution of the encountered free spectrum.
In this paper, we have presented a protocol to perform
cooperative spectrum sensing securely. The protocol allows
authenticating the sensing reports shared by secondary nodes,
which can then make a reliable joint decision on whether the
channel is free or occupied. The protocol does not require the
use of static trusted nodes, which are not found in usual CRN
scenarios and are a dangerous single point of failure. It only
requires some nodes (not necessarily the same ones all the
time) to have access to a Validation Authority.
The protocol is based on the election of coordinator nodes
which centralise the process of sharing the sensing results,
authenticating these results and making the final decision.
These coordinators are evaluated periodically by the other
CRN nodes, in such a way that they can be replaced if their
decisions start to differ from those of the majority.
As part of our future research, we plan to simulate the
protocol and perform tests to verify that the amount of
information transmitted over the network is not excessive.
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